Beneath the Surface · Geopolitics · Global

Britain and the EU pursue Russia's A7 network as its token fades

The token's slump does not settle whether sanctions have reached the Kremlin-blessed payment network behind it, and banks linked to that network remain in the firing line.

The entrance of a Promsvyazbank branch in Moscow: a blue Promsvyazbank sign over a wooden double door in a pale stone building, photographed in 2007
The entrance of a Promsvyazbank branch in Moscow: a blue Promsvyazbank sign over a wooden double door in a pale stone building, photographed in 2007Photo: A.Savin · CC BY-SA 3.0 · Wikimedia Commons

Russian President Vladimir Putin attended a virtual ribbon-cutting ceremony for the opening of A7's Vladivostok branch in September 2025, according to Foreign Policy. Heads of state rarely turn out for a payment company's new office.

According to Elliptic, daily trading in the network's ruble-backed token has slumped far below its peak. That has not closed the file. According to the UK Government on Aug. 31, 2026, Britain acted on May 26 against key banks, entities and individuals linked to the A7 network. The pursuit now reaches past the coin to the business behind it, and whether sanctions can shut a state-blessed payment system is the open question.

According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the company behind the token and its subsidiaries are owned by Ilan Shor, a sanctioned Moldovan oligarch, and by the sanctioned Russian bank Promsvyazbank. A Russian lender, not a crypto start-up, sits at the top of the ownership chain, which makes the network's fate a banking question as much as a crypto one.

A7 claims to have settled more than $86 billion of transactions within its first year of operating, the UK Government reported on Aug. 31, 2026. That is the company's own boast, which Britain repeated without vouching for it.

Chainalysis reported on Aug. 14, 2025 that A7A5 had processed over $51.17 billion in volume through the end of July 2025. That is below A7's own settlement claim, but the two numbers cover different periods and count different things, so the gap proves little on its own.

Elliptic reported on Jan. 21, 2026 that A7A5, a ruble-backed stablecoin launched in January 2025, had logged just under 250,000 transactions from 41,300 distinct accounts. A stablecoin is a crypto token built to hold a steady value against an ordinary currency. So few accounts, set against the billions other trackers have counted, looks more like a wholesale channel for businesses than a coin for the public.

According to The Cryptonomist, the network had an "enormous forgery factory" that was industrially producing fake paperwork, particularly invoices, to justify the payments. That suggests the scheme leaned on ordinary banks as well as blockchains, since an invoice is what a bank checks before it releases money for a trade.

According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, representatives for Shor met with Garantex officers before law enforcement actions led by the U.S. Secret Service, and afterward Garantex officers transferred customer deposits to Grinex. That shows how quickly a shut-down service can reappear under a new name, and why a collapse in one venue says little about the people behind it.

According to Elliptic, average daily transaction volumes in A7A5 fell to a low in June, far below their peak the previous July, and a major security breach hit the Grinex exchange in April. On that record the token faded fast, and a plain reading follows: A7 is already a spent force, and whatever comes next is mopping up.

That reading may be right about the coin. It is weaker on the company. Blockchain trackers see the token, while the forged invoices suggest trade payments running through ordinary banks, where public tracking stops. None of the reporting measures how much the network moved through bank transfers after the token faded, so neither side of this argument can yet be settled from the public record.

The UK Government reported on Aug. 31, 2026 that Britain had imposed sanctions on more than 500 individuals, entities and ships under its Russia sanctions regime so far this year. A7 is one name on a crowded list, which leaves any bank handling Russia-linked payments with a long roster to screen.

The Insider reported on July 24, 2026 that the European Union had added A7A5 project head Leonid Shumakov and Promsvyazbank chairman Mikhail Dorofeev to its sanctions lists, along with the companies A7 Agent and A71. Brussels has gone after the people and subsidiaries, not only the product.

Those listings land first on the executives named and on any lender still clearing their payments.

According to Foreign Policy, the transactions the network processed that were linked to sanctions evasion were roughly equivalent to Russia's prewar annual import bill for high-tech, often dual-use, goods, meaning products with both civilian and military uses. If that channel narrows, Russian buyers of such goods would face slower and costlier payments.

TRM Labs reported on Aug. 14, 2025 that Kyrgyz authorities had issued 126 licenses to virtual asset service providers, firms that trade or hold crypto for clients, by October 2024, and that licensed providers handled $4.2 billion in the first seven months of that year. That measures a whole industry, not the network's share of it. It still shows how large a crypto trade a small Central Asian state had licensed.

A crypto token can lose most of its trade within a year. A payment business built on bank ownership, subsidiaries and invoices is harder to switch off, and the token's fall settles a smaller question than the one its parent company poses.

What would change it. If the next British, EU and U.S. sanctions rounds stop naming banks or firms tied to A7, the sanctions fight over the network has eased, whether or not the network itself has stopped operating.

Sources

UK GovernmentU.S. Department of the TreasuryEllipticChainalysisThe InsiderThe CryptonomistForeign PolicyTRM Labs

28 statements, each tied to its sourceWhat each statement rests onHow ARCANE checks a story

Sources
S1UK Government (GOV.UK) – HM Treasury/FCDO press release: Quoted: "Within its first year of operating, A7 claims to have settled more than $86 billion of transactions." · "On 26 May HMG undertook action targeting key banks, entities and individuals linked to the UK sanctioned A7 network." · "This year alone the UK has imposed sanctions on more than 500 individuals, entities and ships under the Russia sanctions regime." · "31 August 2026"Retrieved Sep 24, 2026
S2U.S. Department of the Treasury: Quoted: "Immediately following the March 6, 2025 law enforcement actions led by the U.S. Secret Service, Garantex officers created the infrastructure to continue to provide key services to Garantex, specifically transferring Garantex customer deposits to Grinex." · "A7 and its subsidiaries A71 Limited Liability Company (A71) and A7 Agent Limited Liability Company (A7 Agent) are owned by sanctioned Moldovan oligarch Ilan Mironovich Shor (Shor) and sanctioned Russian bank Promsvyazbank Public Joint Stock Company (PSB)." · "Public Joint Stock Company (PSB). Prior to the March 6, 2025 law enforcement actions, representatives for Shor met with Garantex officers to"Retrieved Sep 24, 2026
S3Elliptic: Quoted: "Average daily transaction volumes fell to a low of $24.3 million in June 2026, down 96% from its July 2025 peak." · "On or around 16 April 2026, less than two weeks after the card outage, Grinex announced a major security breach" · "in foreign trade. Most provisions take effect on 1 September 2026. To date, the failure of A7A5 has not persuaded the Russian state to give up on"Retrieved Sep 24, 2026
S4Elliptic: Quoted: "A7A5 is a ruble-backed stablecoin launched in January 2025." · "To date, just under 250,000 A7A5 transactions have been made from 41,300 distinct accounts." · "Insights & research Jan 21, 2026 Sanctions +1 Crypto Crime"Retrieved Sep 24, 2026
S5Chainalysis: Quoted: "Through the end of July 2025, A7A5 has processed over $51.17 billion in volume." · "August 14, 2025"Retrieved Sep 24, 2026
S6The Insider: Quoted: "The European Union has imposed sanctions on participants in the A7 cryptocurrency network, adding A7A5 project head Leonid Shumakov and Promsvyazbank chairman Mikhail Dorofeev to its lists, along with the companies A7 Agent and A71." · "The Financial Times previously found that approximately $9.3 billion passed through the ruble-backed A7A5 stablecoin in just four months." · "July 24, 2026 at 03:25 PM"Retrieved Sep 24, 2026
S7The Cryptonomist: Quoted: "A7 had an enormous forgery factory that was industrially producing fake paperwork, particularly invoices, to justify the payments."Retrieved Sep 24, 2026
S8Foreign Policy: Quoted: "Russian President Vladimir Putin attended a virtual ribbon-cutting ceremony for the opening of A7's Vladivostok branch in September 2025." · "Meanwhile, A7 processed some $39 billion in transactions linked to sanctions evasion, a figure roughly equivalent to Russia's prewar annual import bill for high-tech, and often dual-use, goods."Retrieved Sep 24, 2026
S9TRM Labs: Quoted: "In April 2022, Garantex was sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) for facilitating more than USD 100 million in illicit transactions." · "By October 2024, Kyrgyz authorities had issued 126 VASP licenses, and transaction volumes among licensed providers reached $4.2 billion in the first seven months of that year." · "August 14, 2025"Retrieved Sep 24, 2026
ARCANE retrieved every source directly on 2026-09-24. Each claim was checked against those sources and reviewed automatically; no human editor has signed it.
All 9 sources were retrieved from their exact links, so a later change to any of them would be detectable
What each statement rests on (28)
reportedS1, S6, S3

Britain and the EU pursue Russia's A7 network as its token fades

inferredS3, S1, S8

The token's slump does not settle whether sanctions have reached the Kremlin-blessed payment network behind it, and banks linked to that network remain in the firing line.

inferredS1, S3

Beneath the Surface

reportedS8

Russian President Vladimir Putin attended a virtual ribbon-cutting ceremony for the opening of A7's Vladivostok branch in September 2025, according to Foreign Policy. Heads of state rarely turn out for a payment company's new office.

reportedS3, S1

According to Elliptic, daily trading in the network's ruble-backed token has slumped far below its peak. That has not closed the file. According to the UK Government on Aug. 31, 2026, Britain acted on May 26 against key banks, entities and individuals linked to the A7 network. The pursuit now reaches past the coin to the business behind it, and whether sanctions can shut a state-blessed payment system is the open question.

reportedS2

According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the company behind the token and its subsidiaries are owned by Ilan Shor, a sanctioned Moldovan oligarch, and by the sanctioned Russian bank Promsvyazbank. A Russian lender, not a crypto start-up, sits at the top of the ownership chain, which makes the network's fate a banking question as much as a crypto one.

reportedS1

A7 claims to have settled more than $86 billion of transactions within its first year of operating, the UK Government reported on Aug. 31, 2026. That is the company's own boast, which Britain repeated without vouching for it.

reportedS5, S1

Chainalysis reported on Aug. 14, 2025 that A7A5 had processed over $51.17 billion in volume through the end of July 2025. That is below A7's own settlement claim, but the two numbers cover different periods and count different things, so the gap proves little on its own.

reportedS4, S5

Elliptic reported on Jan. 21, 2026 that A7A5, a ruble-backed stablecoin launched in January 2025, had logged just under 250,000 transactions from 41,300 distinct accounts. A stablecoin is a crypto token built to hold a steady value against an ordinary currency. So few accounts, set against the billions other trackers have counted, looks more like a wholesale channel for businesses than a coin for the public.

reportedS7

According to The Cryptonomist, the network had an "enormous forgery factory" that was industrially producing fake paperwork, particularly invoices, to justify the payments. That suggests the scheme leaned on ordinary banks as well as blockchains, since an invoice is what a bank checks before it releases money for a trade.

reportedS2

According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, representatives for Shor met with Garantex officers before law enforcement actions led by the U.S. Secret Service, and afterward Garantex officers transferred customer deposits to Grinex. That shows how quickly a shut-down service can reappear under a new name, and why a collapse in one venue says little about the people behind it.

reportedS3

According to Elliptic, average daily transaction volumes in A7A5 fell to a low in June, far below their peak the previous July, and a major security breach hit the Grinex exchange in April. On that record the token faded fast, and a plain reading follows: A7 is already a spent force, and whatever comes next is mopping up.

inferredS3, S7

That reading may be right about the coin. It is weaker on the company. Blockchain trackers see the token, while the forged invoices suggest trade payments running through ordinary banks, where public tracking stops. None of the reporting measures how much the network moved through bank transfers after the token faded, so neither side of this argument can yet be settled from the public record.

reportedS1

The UK Government reported on Aug. 31, 2026 that Britain had imposed sanctions on more than 500 individuals, entities and ships under its Russia sanctions regime so far this year. A7 is one name on a crowded list, which leaves any bank handling Russia-linked payments with a long roster to screen.

reportedS6

The Insider reported on July 24, 2026 that the European Union had added A7A5 project head Leonid Shumakov and Promsvyazbank chairman Mikhail Dorofeev to its sanctions lists, along with the companies A7 Agent and A71. Brussels has gone after the people and subsidiaries, not only the product.

financial_implicationS6

Those listings land first on the executives named and on any lender still clearing their payments.

financial_implicationS8

According to Foreign Policy, the transactions the network processed that were linked to sanctions evasion were roughly equivalent to Russia's prewar annual import bill for high-tech, often dual-use, goods, meaning products with both civilian and military uses. If that channel narrows, Russian buyers of such goods would face slower and costlier payments.

reportedS9

TRM Labs reported on Aug. 14, 2025 that Kyrgyz authorities had issued 126 licenses to virtual asset service providers, firms that trade or hold crypto for clients, by October 2024, and that licensed providers handled $4.2 billion in the first seven months of that year. That measures a whole industry, not the network's share of it. It still shows how large a crypto trade a small Central Asian state had licensed.

inferredS3, S2, S7

A crypto token can lose most of its trade within a year. A payment business built on bank ownership, subsidiaries and invoices is harder to switch off, and the token's fall settles a smaller question than the one its parent company poses.

inferredS2

A Russian lender, not a crypto start-up, sits at the top of the ownership chain, which makes the network's fate a banking question as much as a crypto one.

testableS1, S6, S3

Watch whether the next British, EU or U.S. sanctions rounds name further banks or firms tied to A7 while trading in its ruble token stays near its lows.

testableS1, S6, S2

If the next British, EU and U.S. sanctions rounds stop naming banks or firms tied to A7, the sanctions fight over the network has eased, whether or not the network itself has stopped operating.

financial_implicationS1, S6

Banks and payment firms in third countries that settle Russia-linked trade carry this read, with pressure pointing toward more sanctions listings if the payment network is still operating.

inferredS3, S1, S6

The slump in the Russian ruble token has not ended the sanctions fight over the payment network behind it, which remains the larger target.

financial_implicationS1, S6, S8

Banks, payment agents and executives tied to the Russian payment network carry the exposure, along with Russian importers who rely on it.

inferredS1, S6

Pressure points toward more sanctions listings of the network's banks, subsidiaries and officers rather than fewer.

testableS1, S6

The first public measure to move would be the names added to Western sanctions lists that tie new banks or firms to the network.

testableS1, S6

The observation window runs over the next two quarters of sanctions announcements.

Alpha's read · open

The slump in the Russian ruble token has not ended the sanctions fight over the payment network behind it, which remains the larger target.

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